Sharpening Dull Swords

Since the American pacification of Japan following World War II, the Japanese people and their American designed constitution have placed little emphasis on the use of force as a foreign policy tool. Although they reserve the right to armed self defense, the preferred method of coercion remains financial. The United States has lessened Japan’s requirement for armed foreign policies as it has largely taken responsibility for Japan’s defense and incorporated it under its regional foreign and defense policy umbrella. Owing much of its security and economic health to the United States, it may come as little wonder that Japan was willing to support the unpopular invasion of Iraq in 2003, albeit in limited ways. This was mostly unlike former axis ally Germany, which rebuffed American growling, although it did indirectly support the 2003 Iraq war as a staging area for U.S. forces. In any case, Japan has been slowly moving from its seemingly permanent dovish state to one of realism with a slight whiff or nationalism.

Since the 1991 Gulf War, which Japan unambiguously sat out, Japan has sought a more active role in foreign policy, often mirroring that of its most ardent supporter, the United States. The change in its defense ethos was clear following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (which were generally widely condemned) and especially during the 2003 Iraq war invasion (which was much less popular). Focusing on Iraq for the moment, instead of refraining from support of the war, once it was clear Saddam Hussein would not cede power, Japan was one of the few states to support American-led unilateral intervention. This was a clear demonstration of loyalty, but also conflicted with the Japanese notion of non-aggression in some ways. As to not create an unpopular situation, Japan committed itself to assisting the Iraq invasion and ongoing combat operations with non-lethal support, such as ship refueling, rebuilding efforts, and financial aid. This may have been unthinkable before 1991.

Such a high risk move may be a reflection of the times. Perhaps Japan is no longer satisfied with being handcuffed when it comes to international conflict issues. Not to be mistaken, Japan’s preferred method of conflict resolution has been through mediation and consensus, as demonstrated in its relations with North Korea and China. However, perhaps emboldened by the American “Axis of Evil” rallying cry, Japan has seen an opportunity to fully exploit American pressure against North Korea to enhance its security. In fact, talk of a nuclear deterrent in Japan would have been unthinkable years ago, while many Japanese would not shy away from such a discussion today and North Korea shrugs off diplomatic advances and carried out a presumed nuclear test. In matters of missile defense and military power, the need to be peaceful is increasingly being matched by the need of the Japanese people to feel secure.

In the next twenty years, Japan may continue to be an important ally in the region, as may have been symbolized as Japan’s prime minister was the first invited to meet President Barack Obama. However, Japan must also remain astute towards the challenges posed by China and North Korea in an era when American hegemony is being challenged or even believed to be in decline. That means that Japan will be hypersensitive to American policy movement when assessing its defense situation, continue to court American power in the region, and double its efforts to build ties with China, the clear power in the region. As America lends Japan clout and security, China will offer it more economic opportunity in the future. It will have to learn how to maintain this delicate balance while adapting its constitution for future threats, especially from North Korea.