Security will be a chief issue in Asia as it is forced to both strengthen internal security as a result of internal unrest resulting from the current economic crisis, to carefully managing the relations between Russia, China, and India in their inevitable moves towards more power and influence.
On the internal security front, as workers lose their jobs or multinational corporations close or relocate to less expensive areas, there will be an increased demand on governments for public welfare support or subsidies that the state will be less able to afford due to less state revenue. Even in prosperous economic conditions, interests within a state may be controlled to prevent one segment of society from gaining too much influence (in China, for instance). In Asia, where central governments are relatively stronger than those in the West, internal security is a requirement for subsequent issues like economic development and political stability.
Asia will also have to reconcile the interests of three rising powers like China, India, and Russia and carefully manage those competing interests in the region to avoid war or dangerously high tensions with the United States or even Australia. For instance, both China and India will need an ever increasing amount of fossil fuels to sustain their growth, but that puts them in direct competition with each other for markets and with the United States. Additionally, the need for primary goods in general will rise, putting both China and India in more contact with other nations able to supply primary goods (like minerals) and require a more complex foreign policy to meet their supply goals and win sources over their competition.
Samstag, 21. März 2009
Samstag, 14. März 2009
ASEAN -- Good Enough for Now
With so many examples of foreign meddling in Asia, it is little wonder that states in the east Asian region feel as if they need a regional bloc to maintain the strength of the region and ensure that foreign powers no longer exert the power they once commanded. That was one major reason that led to the establishment of The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN in 1967. Economically and militarily vulnerable, ASEAN members sought both political and economic stability as they sought to rebuild their governing mechanisms still affected by the legacy of colonialism. Additionally, the region was politically volatile as communist revolutions in China and Vietnam and feared expansionist policies in Indonesia that could affect smaller states.
Despite a mission that seemed doomed from the beginning, ASEAN has survived the rise of China, withdraw of U.S. bases in the Philippines, Asian economic crisis, and the recent uprisings in Burma. Much of its success is more economic than political, though.
Initially, it was difficult to imagine ASEAN as an effective trade cooperative with so many states all competing with each other for markets, especially when their major trade efforts were concentrated in Japan. However, ASEAN has been able to approach trade deals with other blocs like the United States and Europe with collective strength and eliminate some of the tariffs ASEAN states were charging each other, creating a free trade zone for ASEAN members. This encourages more trade among the states and helps diversify markets. In fact, Japan is no longer the prime destination for ASEAN goods and they are no longer dependent on Japan for their livelihood.
There are some limitations to ASEAN from a western perspective, though. First, ASEAN is inherently wary of foreign power, as outlined in its charter. Perhaps more importantly, it is wary of any intervention – even among fellow ASEAN members – in its member affairs. For instance, the recent Myanmar uprisings were not criticized strongly by ASEAN, not was the Myanmar government’s response to the devastating flooding there. This has meant that ASEAN is not usually viewed as a advocate for human rights in general, as this would constitute interference in other governments. Most of all, ASEAN is mostly politically impotent as a intergovernmental bloc. It’s most important accomplishments are mostly economic.
It would appear that the Southeast Asian priorities at the moment are and have been maintaining political stability regardless of the consequences for human rights (protection of common good over the protection of the common individual) and economics. Economically, they have diversified their markets, but still remain indirectly dependent on great foreign powers. In any case, ASEAN is an organization with limited potential that must grow into a mission as it goes. Obviously, with such a culturally diverse and fragile relationship, members must tread lightly or risk the organization falling apart. That perhaps explains why it is not an intergovernmental organization like that one is accustomed to in the West, like the NAFTA, the EU, or NATO.
Despite a mission that seemed doomed from the beginning, ASEAN has survived the rise of China, withdraw of U.S. bases in the Philippines, Asian economic crisis, and the recent uprisings in Burma. Much of its success is more economic than political, though.
Initially, it was difficult to imagine ASEAN as an effective trade cooperative with so many states all competing with each other for markets, especially when their major trade efforts were concentrated in Japan. However, ASEAN has been able to approach trade deals with other blocs like the United States and Europe with collective strength and eliminate some of the tariffs ASEAN states were charging each other, creating a free trade zone for ASEAN members. This encourages more trade among the states and helps diversify markets. In fact, Japan is no longer the prime destination for ASEAN goods and they are no longer dependent on Japan for their livelihood.
There are some limitations to ASEAN from a western perspective, though. First, ASEAN is inherently wary of foreign power, as outlined in its charter. Perhaps more importantly, it is wary of any intervention – even among fellow ASEAN members – in its member affairs. For instance, the recent Myanmar uprisings were not criticized strongly by ASEAN, not was the Myanmar government’s response to the devastating flooding there. This has meant that ASEAN is not usually viewed as a advocate for human rights in general, as this would constitute interference in other governments. Most of all, ASEAN is mostly politically impotent as a intergovernmental bloc. It’s most important accomplishments are mostly economic.
It would appear that the Southeast Asian priorities at the moment are and have been maintaining political stability regardless of the consequences for human rights (protection of common good over the protection of the common individual) and economics. Economically, they have diversified their markets, but still remain indirectly dependent on great foreign powers. In any case, ASEAN is an organization with limited potential that must grow into a mission as it goes. Obviously, with such a culturally diverse and fragile relationship, members must tread lightly or risk the organization falling apart. That perhaps explains why it is not an intergovernmental organization like that one is accustomed to in the West, like the NAFTA, the EU, or NATO.
Samstag, 7. März 2009
Sharpening Dull Swords
Since the American pacification of Japan following World War II, the Japanese people and their American designed constitution have placed little emphasis on the use of force as a foreign policy tool. Although they reserve the right to armed self defense, the preferred method of coercion remains financial. The United States has lessened Japan’s requirement for armed foreign policies as it has largely taken responsibility for Japan’s defense and incorporated it under its regional foreign and defense policy umbrella. Owing much of its security and economic health to the United States, it may come as little wonder that Japan was willing to support the unpopular invasion of Iraq in 2003, albeit in limited ways. This was mostly unlike former axis ally Germany, which rebuffed American growling, although it did indirectly support the 2003 Iraq war as a staging area for U.S. forces. In any case, Japan has been slowly moving from its seemingly permanent dovish state to one of realism with a slight whiff or nationalism.
Since the 1991 Gulf War, which Japan unambiguously sat out, Japan has sought a more active role in foreign policy, often mirroring that of its most ardent supporter, the United States. The change in its defense ethos was clear following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (which were generally widely condemned) and especially during the 2003 Iraq war invasion (which was much less popular). Focusing on Iraq for the moment, instead of refraining from support of the war, once it was clear Saddam Hussein would not cede power, Japan was one of the few states to support American-led unilateral intervention. This was a clear demonstration of loyalty, but also conflicted with the Japanese notion of non-aggression in some ways. As to not create an unpopular situation, Japan committed itself to assisting the Iraq invasion and ongoing combat operations with non-lethal support, such as ship refueling, rebuilding efforts, and financial aid. This may have been unthinkable before 1991.
Such a high risk move may be a reflection of the times. Perhaps Japan is no longer satisfied with being handcuffed when it comes to international conflict issues. Not to be mistaken, Japan’s preferred method of conflict resolution has been through mediation and consensus, as demonstrated in its relations with North Korea and China. However, perhaps emboldened by the American “Axis of Evil” rallying cry, Japan has seen an opportunity to fully exploit American pressure against North Korea to enhance its security. In fact, talk of a nuclear deterrent in Japan would have been unthinkable years ago, while many Japanese would not shy away from such a discussion today and North Korea shrugs off diplomatic advances and carried out a presumed nuclear test. In matters of missile defense and military power, the need to be peaceful is increasingly being matched by the need of the Japanese people to feel secure.
In the next twenty years, Japan may continue to be an important ally in the region, as may have been symbolized as Japan’s prime minister was the first invited to meet President Barack Obama. However, Japan must also remain astute towards the challenges posed by China and North Korea in an era when American hegemony is being challenged or even believed to be in decline. That means that Japan will be hypersensitive to American policy movement when assessing its defense situation, continue to court American power in the region, and double its efforts to build ties with China, the clear power in the region. As America lends Japan clout and security, China will offer it more economic opportunity in the future. It will have to learn how to maintain this delicate balance while adapting its constitution for future threats, especially from North Korea.
Since the 1991 Gulf War, which Japan unambiguously sat out, Japan has sought a more active role in foreign policy, often mirroring that of its most ardent supporter, the United States. The change in its defense ethos was clear following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (which were generally widely condemned) and especially during the 2003 Iraq war invasion (which was much less popular). Focusing on Iraq for the moment, instead of refraining from support of the war, once it was clear Saddam Hussein would not cede power, Japan was one of the few states to support American-led unilateral intervention. This was a clear demonstration of loyalty, but also conflicted with the Japanese notion of non-aggression in some ways. As to not create an unpopular situation, Japan committed itself to assisting the Iraq invasion and ongoing combat operations with non-lethal support, such as ship refueling, rebuilding efforts, and financial aid. This may have been unthinkable before 1991.
Such a high risk move may be a reflection of the times. Perhaps Japan is no longer satisfied with being handcuffed when it comes to international conflict issues. Not to be mistaken, Japan’s preferred method of conflict resolution has been through mediation and consensus, as demonstrated in its relations with North Korea and China. However, perhaps emboldened by the American “Axis of Evil” rallying cry, Japan has seen an opportunity to fully exploit American pressure against North Korea to enhance its security. In fact, talk of a nuclear deterrent in Japan would have been unthinkable years ago, while many Japanese would not shy away from such a discussion today and North Korea shrugs off diplomatic advances and carried out a presumed nuclear test. In matters of missile defense and military power, the need to be peaceful is increasingly being matched by the need of the Japanese people to feel secure.
In the next twenty years, Japan may continue to be an important ally in the region, as may have been symbolized as Japan’s prime minister was the first invited to meet President Barack Obama. However, Japan must also remain astute towards the challenges posed by China and North Korea in an era when American hegemony is being challenged or even believed to be in decline. That means that Japan will be hypersensitive to American policy movement when assessing its defense situation, continue to court American power in the region, and double its efforts to build ties with China, the clear power in the region. As America lends Japan clout and security, China will offer it more economic opportunity in the future. It will have to learn how to maintain this delicate balance while adapting its constitution for future threats, especially from North Korea.
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