Security will be a chief issue in Asia as it is forced to both strengthen internal security as a result of internal unrest resulting from the current economic crisis, to carefully managing the relations between Russia, China, and India in their inevitable moves towards more power and influence.
On the internal security front, as workers lose their jobs or multinational corporations close or relocate to less expensive areas, there will be an increased demand on governments for public welfare support or subsidies that the state will be less able to afford due to less state revenue. Even in prosperous economic conditions, interests within a state may be controlled to prevent one segment of society from gaining too much influence (in China, for instance). In Asia, where central governments are relatively stronger than those in the West, internal security is a requirement for subsequent issues like economic development and political stability.
Asia will also have to reconcile the interests of three rising powers like China, India, and Russia and carefully manage those competing interests in the region to avoid war or dangerously high tensions with the United States or even Australia. For instance, both China and India will need an ever increasing amount of fossil fuels to sustain their growth, but that puts them in direct competition with each other for markets and with the United States. Additionally, the need for primary goods in general will rise, putting both China and India in more contact with other nations able to supply primary goods (like minerals) and require a more complex foreign policy to meet their supply goals and win sources over their competition.
Samstag, 21. März 2009
Samstag, 14. März 2009
ASEAN -- Good Enough for Now
With so many examples of foreign meddling in Asia, it is little wonder that states in the east Asian region feel as if they need a regional bloc to maintain the strength of the region and ensure that foreign powers no longer exert the power they once commanded. That was one major reason that led to the establishment of The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN in 1967. Economically and militarily vulnerable, ASEAN members sought both political and economic stability as they sought to rebuild their governing mechanisms still affected by the legacy of colonialism. Additionally, the region was politically volatile as communist revolutions in China and Vietnam and feared expansionist policies in Indonesia that could affect smaller states.
Despite a mission that seemed doomed from the beginning, ASEAN has survived the rise of China, withdraw of U.S. bases in the Philippines, Asian economic crisis, and the recent uprisings in Burma. Much of its success is more economic than political, though.
Initially, it was difficult to imagine ASEAN as an effective trade cooperative with so many states all competing with each other for markets, especially when their major trade efforts were concentrated in Japan. However, ASEAN has been able to approach trade deals with other blocs like the United States and Europe with collective strength and eliminate some of the tariffs ASEAN states were charging each other, creating a free trade zone for ASEAN members. This encourages more trade among the states and helps diversify markets. In fact, Japan is no longer the prime destination for ASEAN goods and they are no longer dependent on Japan for their livelihood.
There are some limitations to ASEAN from a western perspective, though. First, ASEAN is inherently wary of foreign power, as outlined in its charter. Perhaps more importantly, it is wary of any intervention – even among fellow ASEAN members – in its member affairs. For instance, the recent Myanmar uprisings were not criticized strongly by ASEAN, not was the Myanmar government’s response to the devastating flooding there. This has meant that ASEAN is not usually viewed as a advocate for human rights in general, as this would constitute interference in other governments. Most of all, ASEAN is mostly politically impotent as a intergovernmental bloc. It’s most important accomplishments are mostly economic.
It would appear that the Southeast Asian priorities at the moment are and have been maintaining political stability regardless of the consequences for human rights (protection of common good over the protection of the common individual) and economics. Economically, they have diversified their markets, but still remain indirectly dependent on great foreign powers. In any case, ASEAN is an organization with limited potential that must grow into a mission as it goes. Obviously, with such a culturally diverse and fragile relationship, members must tread lightly or risk the organization falling apart. That perhaps explains why it is not an intergovernmental organization like that one is accustomed to in the West, like the NAFTA, the EU, or NATO.
Despite a mission that seemed doomed from the beginning, ASEAN has survived the rise of China, withdraw of U.S. bases in the Philippines, Asian economic crisis, and the recent uprisings in Burma. Much of its success is more economic than political, though.
Initially, it was difficult to imagine ASEAN as an effective trade cooperative with so many states all competing with each other for markets, especially when their major trade efforts were concentrated in Japan. However, ASEAN has been able to approach trade deals with other blocs like the United States and Europe with collective strength and eliminate some of the tariffs ASEAN states were charging each other, creating a free trade zone for ASEAN members. This encourages more trade among the states and helps diversify markets. In fact, Japan is no longer the prime destination for ASEAN goods and they are no longer dependent on Japan for their livelihood.
There are some limitations to ASEAN from a western perspective, though. First, ASEAN is inherently wary of foreign power, as outlined in its charter. Perhaps more importantly, it is wary of any intervention – even among fellow ASEAN members – in its member affairs. For instance, the recent Myanmar uprisings were not criticized strongly by ASEAN, not was the Myanmar government’s response to the devastating flooding there. This has meant that ASEAN is not usually viewed as a advocate for human rights in general, as this would constitute interference in other governments. Most of all, ASEAN is mostly politically impotent as a intergovernmental bloc. It’s most important accomplishments are mostly economic.
It would appear that the Southeast Asian priorities at the moment are and have been maintaining political stability regardless of the consequences for human rights (protection of common good over the protection of the common individual) and economics. Economically, they have diversified their markets, but still remain indirectly dependent on great foreign powers. In any case, ASEAN is an organization with limited potential that must grow into a mission as it goes. Obviously, with such a culturally diverse and fragile relationship, members must tread lightly or risk the organization falling apart. That perhaps explains why it is not an intergovernmental organization like that one is accustomed to in the West, like the NAFTA, the EU, or NATO.
Samstag, 7. März 2009
Sharpening Dull Swords
Since the American pacification of Japan following World War II, the Japanese people and their American designed constitution have placed little emphasis on the use of force as a foreign policy tool. Although they reserve the right to armed self defense, the preferred method of coercion remains financial. The United States has lessened Japan’s requirement for armed foreign policies as it has largely taken responsibility for Japan’s defense and incorporated it under its regional foreign and defense policy umbrella. Owing much of its security and economic health to the United States, it may come as little wonder that Japan was willing to support the unpopular invasion of Iraq in 2003, albeit in limited ways. This was mostly unlike former axis ally Germany, which rebuffed American growling, although it did indirectly support the 2003 Iraq war as a staging area for U.S. forces. In any case, Japan has been slowly moving from its seemingly permanent dovish state to one of realism with a slight whiff or nationalism.
Since the 1991 Gulf War, which Japan unambiguously sat out, Japan has sought a more active role in foreign policy, often mirroring that of its most ardent supporter, the United States. The change in its defense ethos was clear following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (which were generally widely condemned) and especially during the 2003 Iraq war invasion (which was much less popular). Focusing on Iraq for the moment, instead of refraining from support of the war, once it was clear Saddam Hussein would not cede power, Japan was one of the few states to support American-led unilateral intervention. This was a clear demonstration of loyalty, but also conflicted with the Japanese notion of non-aggression in some ways. As to not create an unpopular situation, Japan committed itself to assisting the Iraq invasion and ongoing combat operations with non-lethal support, such as ship refueling, rebuilding efforts, and financial aid. This may have been unthinkable before 1991.
Such a high risk move may be a reflection of the times. Perhaps Japan is no longer satisfied with being handcuffed when it comes to international conflict issues. Not to be mistaken, Japan’s preferred method of conflict resolution has been through mediation and consensus, as demonstrated in its relations with North Korea and China. However, perhaps emboldened by the American “Axis of Evil” rallying cry, Japan has seen an opportunity to fully exploit American pressure against North Korea to enhance its security. In fact, talk of a nuclear deterrent in Japan would have been unthinkable years ago, while many Japanese would not shy away from such a discussion today and North Korea shrugs off diplomatic advances and carried out a presumed nuclear test. In matters of missile defense and military power, the need to be peaceful is increasingly being matched by the need of the Japanese people to feel secure.
In the next twenty years, Japan may continue to be an important ally in the region, as may have been symbolized as Japan’s prime minister was the first invited to meet President Barack Obama. However, Japan must also remain astute towards the challenges posed by China and North Korea in an era when American hegemony is being challenged or even believed to be in decline. That means that Japan will be hypersensitive to American policy movement when assessing its defense situation, continue to court American power in the region, and double its efforts to build ties with China, the clear power in the region. As America lends Japan clout and security, China will offer it more economic opportunity in the future. It will have to learn how to maintain this delicate balance while adapting its constitution for future threats, especially from North Korea.
Since the 1991 Gulf War, which Japan unambiguously sat out, Japan has sought a more active role in foreign policy, often mirroring that of its most ardent supporter, the United States. The change in its defense ethos was clear following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (which were generally widely condemned) and especially during the 2003 Iraq war invasion (which was much less popular). Focusing on Iraq for the moment, instead of refraining from support of the war, once it was clear Saddam Hussein would not cede power, Japan was one of the few states to support American-led unilateral intervention. This was a clear demonstration of loyalty, but also conflicted with the Japanese notion of non-aggression in some ways. As to not create an unpopular situation, Japan committed itself to assisting the Iraq invasion and ongoing combat operations with non-lethal support, such as ship refueling, rebuilding efforts, and financial aid. This may have been unthinkable before 1991.
Such a high risk move may be a reflection of the times. Perhaps Japan is no longer satisfied with being handcuffed when it comes to international conflict issues. Not to be mistaken, Japan’s preferred method of conflict resolution has been through mediation and consensus, as demonstrated in its relations with North Korea and China. However, perhaps emboldened by the American “Axis of Evil” rallying cry, Japan has seen an opportunity to fully exploit American pressure against North Korea to enhance its security. In fact, talk of a nuclear deterrent in Japan would have been unthinkable years ago, while many Japanese would not shy away from such a discussion today and North Korea shrugs off diplomatic advances and carried out a presumed nuclear test. In matters of missile defense and military power, the need to be peaceful is increasingly being matched by the need of the Japanese people to feel secure.
In the next twenty years, Japan may continue to be an important ally in the region, as may have been symbolized as Japan’s prime minister was the first invited to meet President Barack Obama. However, Japan must also remain astute towards the challenges posed by China and North Korea in an era when American hegemony is being challenged or even believed to be in decline. That means that Japan will be hypersensitive to American policy movement when assessing its defense situation, continue to court American power in the region, and double its efforts to build ties with China, the clear power in the region. As America lends Japan clout and security, China will offer it more economic opportunity in the future. It will have to learn how to maintain this delicate balance while adapting its constitution for future threats, especially from North Korea.
Samstag, 28. Februar 2009
China and the Big Dip
China is a state connected inextricably to the world market, especially through the United States. This poses great opportunities as well as challenges for the Chinese leadership, which they have acknowledged will require their full participation in the 21st century. Specifically, China has become both the supplier of choice in commodities and slightly advanced goods to the United States and others. While this provides much economic opportunity, it also creates a system of dependence, whereby China’s economic health is closely tied to that of America. The current economic crisis is an example of how closely linked the two ideological opponents are in the marketplace. Where demand in the U.S. for consumer goods like toys and electronics drop, so too do jobs at factories producing parts for everything from Barbie to iPods. Currently, factories supplying goods such as these are scaling back or going out of business completely. As the latest Economist magazine reports, the company producing the iPod and PlayStation for their respective brand names used to employ over 250,000 general laborers, but has let over 100,000 of them go. In a way, China is a barometer for global economic health in a close-knit market.
The solutions to this dependency include focusing on the middle class as consumers and expanding domestic markets. Additionally, although it may seem counterintuitive, investing in more U.S. debt to ensure that there is a mutual dependency and mutual interest in the success of each other’s economies. This peaceful approach to power, according to the Chinese government, is their modus operandi for now and in the future. However, the recent satellite shoot down and space warfare experimentation served as a reminder to the world that China is capable of expanding conflict into space if necessary and that it has come out as an advanced power.
The solutions for success are limited, though. Many of China’s laborers have been sent home from urban factories back to their rural, poor communities because of the current economic slump. Factories producing low margin, low value goods like textiles are still churning out products, but there is little reason to believe this activity could produce a middle class in the numbers needed to sustain a healthy domestic Chinese economy to replace the orders from the U.S. and other developed countries. China will also have to diversify its market and trading partners while maintaining ties with the U.S. in preparation for the hoped for recovery in the future. However, many consumers associate Chinese products with being “cheap.” Even while I was in Iraq, Iraqis had a low opinion of Chinese goods. In fact, “Chinese” was an epithet for “cheap.” If the Chinese are to get away from this opinion, and keep manufactures from fleeing to cheaper labor markets like Sri Lanka and Vietnam, they should begin developing higher quality, higher technology products and begin staking out leadership positions in those markets – competing head to head for dominance with Boeing, Caterpillar, and Research In Motion (although I dare say that, as I invest in all three!). The point it, the only way to emerge stronger from the current slump would be to rethink what they are producing and instead attract more valuable investment that can’t simply be replaced. And, the United States should also do the same.
References:
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13145129
The solutions to this dependency include focusing on the middle class as consumers and expanding domestic markets. Additionally, although it may seem counterintuitive, investing in more U.S. debt to ensure that there is a mutual dependency and mutual interest in the success of each other’s economies. This peaceful approach to power, according to the Chinese government, is their modus operandi for now and in the future. However, the recent satellite shoot down and space warfare experimentation served as a reminder to the world that China is capable of expanding conflict into space if necessary and that it has come out as an advanced power.
The solutions for success are limited, though. Many of China’s laborers have been sent home from urban factories back to their rural, poor communities because of the current economic slump. Factories producing low margin, low value goods like textiles are still churning out products, but there is little reason to believe this activity could produce a middle class in the numbers needed to sustain a healthy domestic Chinese economy to replace the orders from the U.S. and other developed countries. China will also have to diversify its market and trading partners while maintaining ties with the U.S. in preparation for the hoped for recovery in the future. However, many consumers associate Chinese products with being “cheap.” Even while I was in Iraq, Iraqis had a low opinion of Chinese goods. In fact, “Chinese” was an epithet for “cheap.” If the Chinese are to get away from this opinion, and keep manufactures from fleeing to cheaper labor markets like Sri Lanka and Vietnam, they should begin developing higher quality, higher technology products and begin staking out leadership positions in those markets – competing head to head for dominance with Boeing, Caterpillar, and Research In Motion (although I dare say that, as I invest in all three!). The point it, the only way to emerge stronger from the current slump would be to rethink what they are producing and instead attract more valuable investment that can’t simply be replaced. And, the United States should also do the same.
References:
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13145129
Samstag, 21. Februar 2009
The Two Koreas and the Cold War
The most important effects of the Cold War on the political development of the two Koreas were most obviously the division of a unified nation into two separate camps: the communist north and the semi-free south under military rule (which had been a democracy that wilted under pressure and then would later become a democracy decades later). Even leading up to the Korean War, Soviet interests were strongly represented in the north and American interests in the south through proxy leaders like Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee. With such powerful interests involved it was almost impossible for local interests and leaders to become influential without first courting either party to the Cold War. After suffering from Japanese rule, the Korean people were once again subject to foreign interference following the end of World War II. Cold War pressures between the two interests became so intense as to spark the almost inevitable Korean War and cement South Korea firmly within the U.S. security plan for the region, whereas earlier U.S. representation in the country had been limited. Following the Korean War (which technically still continues), the establishment of U.S. long-term interests in South Korea ensured a government would be willing to develop pro-U.S. policies in security and economic matters, build stronger ties to former enemy Japan, and remain opposed to the north during the military regime that ruled the south until the end of the Cold War. This ensured the development of a liberal democracy, while the north and its orientation towards Leninist, Soviet-style, personality driven authoritarian government put it on a path towards isolationism and underdevelopment.
The end of the Cold War has brought political developments such as the transition of South Korea into a full democracy in 1993 and a more reconciliatory posture towards the north in the interest of reunification. However, the south’s relationship with the United States remains especially important as the north continues to threaten the south with rhetoric while at the same time suggesting that it is working (or achieved) nuclear capability. The end of the Cold War has turned the Korean conflict into less of a proxy conflict and more into a Korean and Asian problem where one undeniably backward and corrupt government (the north) has failed to take advantage of the economic opportunities its neighbors have.
As South Korea continues to develop, it will become important in the coming years that the two sides reconcile in areas where possible and the north move away from its suicidal policies which have only hurt its people. While the current northern government is probably avoiding this scenario to avoid losing power or hinting weakness, it is only a matter of time before the unification occurs, I believe.
The end of the Cold War has brought political developments such as the transition of South Korea into a full democracy in 1993 and a more reconciliatory posture towards the north in the interest of reunification. However, the south’s relationship with the United States remains especially important as the north continues to threaten the south with rhetoric while at the same time suggesting that it is working (or achieved) nuclear capability. The end of the Cold War has turned the Korean conflict into less of a proxy conflict and more into a Korean and Asian problem where one undeniably backward and corrupt government (the north) has failed to take advantage of the economic opportunities its neighbors have.
As South Korea continues to develop, it will become important in the coming years that the two sides reconcile in areas where possible and the north move away from its suicidal policies which have only hurt its people. While the current northern government is probably avoiding this scenario to avoid losing power or hinting weakness, it is only a matter of time before the unification occurs, I believe.
Samstag, 14. Februar 2009
Perfecting Single Party Rule in China and Vietnam
The possibilities in the long-term for countries such as China and Vietnam to pursue economic liberalization while still maintaining tight one party political control are likely very good. Unlike other single party, authoritarian states that were not able to meet the primary needs of their constituents, like East Germany and the Soviet Union, today’s authoritarian regimes have learned from the past, in effect becoming sustainable authoritarian regimes.
China has been able to maintain political control while restricting freedom of expression and other political dissent because it has been able to use economic liberalization to its advantage. By providing education, a higher quality of life, and a reliable flow of modern consumer goods to the market, there is a diverse marketplace and educated workforce that is able to sustain the market. If material needs are being met and a professional middle class is able to work, then the state may be able to garner support for the system apparently responsible for creating that opportunity and political dissidents may be marginalized as antisocial deviants who threaten the very state that created the prosperity. In the case of China and Vietnam, one may observe how financial liberalization does not necessarily create democratic conditions.
The infrastructure of dissent, like the press, internet, independent political parties, student organizations, independent labor organizations, religious groups, and other outlets – not markets – may be more responsible for bringing an end to single party rule. If China and Vietnam insist on suppressing the infrastructure of dissent while providing policies that create more jobs and a limited welfare system, there is a high probability, in my opinion that single party rule will continue.
If you have a generation of people who have transformed from peasants to the middle class as a direct result of state policies, it is difficult to imagine the new middle class becoming belligerent towards the master government. If the state can use international trade to its favor to sustain growth, authoritarianism will continued to be sustained as well. Instead of the heavy industrialization, Leninist policies of the past, China and Vietnam today are market savvy and know that if they keep the people happy and consumer oriented, there will be less demand for political discussion. Indeed, while they may liberalize economic policies, it would be very surprising to see liberalization in media, religious, and private social organization. As long as there is economic opportunity, the Chinese and Vietnamese model of sustainable authoritarianism will continue to support single party rule. However, once the middle class have tasted consumerism and become embedded in it, economic misfortune resulting in a reduction of social services and quality of life could spell trouble in those regimes. The question is whether or not they will concede some power in a compromise to the people, or seek a militant suppression of dissent if economic hard times fall on them. In any case, I believe China and Vietnam have proven, at least in the short term, that democracy and the market do not necessarily and inextricably complement each other. If anything, just as democracies have the capacity to perfect and reform themselves, so too have authoritarian regimes savvy enough to turn their weaknesses into their strengths.
China has been able to maintain political control while restricting freedom of expression and other political dissent because it has been able to use economic liberalization to its advantage. By providing education, a higher quality of life, and a reliable flow of modern consumer goods to the market, there is a diverse marketplace and educated workforce that is able to sustain the market. If material needs are being met and a professional middle class is able to work, then the state may be able to garner support for the system apparently responsible for creating that opportunity and political dissidents may be marginalized as antisocial deviants who threaten the very state that created the prosperity. In the case of China and Vietnam, one may observe how financial liberalization does not necessarily create democratic conditions.
The infrastructure of dissent, like the press, internet, independent political parties, student organizations, independent labor organizations, religious groups, and other outlets – not markets – may be more responsible for bringing an end to single party rule. If China and Vietnam insist on suppressing the infrastructure of dissent while providing policies that create more jobs and a limited welfare system, there is a high probability, in my opinion that single party rule will continue.
If you have a generation of people who have transformed from peasants to the middle class as a direct result of state policies, it is difficult to imagine the new middle class becoming belligerent towards the master government. If the state can use international trade to its favor to sustain growth, authoritarianism will continued to be sustained as well. Instead of the heavy industrialization, Leninist policies of the past, China and Vietnam today are market savvy and know that if they keep the people happy and consumer oriented, there will be less demand for political discussion. Indeed, while they may liberalize economic policies, it would be very surprising to see liberalization in media, religious, and private social organization. As long as there is economic opportunity, the Chinese and Vietnamese model of sustainable authoritarianism will continue to support single party rule. However, once the middle class have tasted consumerism and become embedded in it, economic misfortune resulting in a reduction of social services and quality of life could spell trouble in those regimes. The question is whether or not they will concede some power in a compromise to the people, or seek a militant suppression of dissent if economic hard times fall on them. In any case, I believe China and Vietnam have proven, at least in the short term, that democracy and the market do not necessarily and inextricably complement each other. If anything, just as democracies have the capacity to perfect and reform themselves, so too have authoritarian regimes savvy enough to turn their weaknesses into their strengths.
Samstag, 7. Februar 2009
Resisting Colonialism in Thailand
There are many factors that contributed to Thailand not being colonized in the 19th and 20th centuries. Early in the book “The Asian Pacific” by Vera Simone, she initially attributes Thailand’s success at repelling European colonial expansion, which had swept up other larger countries like China, to the clever diplomacy of King Rama IV and “the willingness of France and England to have his country serve as a buffer between their holdings…” 1 However many other factors also account for Thailand’s durability in the face of imperialism, not simply the beneficence of powerful nations. Some of the leading factors, which will be covered in more detail below, included a consolidation of national government power, cementing nationalism, and rapidly moving towards self-imposed modernism. All three of these movements would make Thailand a much more complex system for colonial powers to manipulate and control.
Unlike China, Thai leaders worked methodically to consolidate government power in Thailand once they perceived the European colonial threat. While at once working to avoid conflict with Western powers by avoiding reactionary or arbitrary policies that would spark a conflict, King Mongkut and his successors led a top-down reform that incorporated local power bases into a nationally controlled scheme and integrated those local leaders who lost power in the process into the national bureaucracy. 2 The focus of government transformed from that of local, semiautonomous cells of administration to a centralized body with specialized departments with national responsibility. This transformation led to a more powerful central government able to approach dissent and threats in a more cohesive way. Indeed, cultural cohesion within the nation was strengthened with the new mandate of the national government.
As in other Asian countries reacting to colonialism, nationalism played an important role in Thailand, but more in a preemptive role as opposed to an armed opposition role in the 19th and early 20th century. For example, nationalism and an idea of a unique and proud Thai state made it more difficult for Western powers to manipulate the Thai people into inequitable agreements (although some inequitable agreements were made for the sake of neutral relations with France and Britain, but not on the same devastating scale as in China). 3 The government used its power and moral capital to promote a standard Thai language (which would effectively allow all Thais to communicate in a common vernacular and concurrently weaken regional differences), elevate the prestige of the royal family as the ultimate national leadership body, and promote the role of orthodox Thammayut Buddhism in society, which the royal family was undeniably and piously devoted to. 4 These movements, in addition to other cultural reforms, served to strengthen the bond of Thai citizens and promote a nationalistic view of themselves in opposition to outside influence.
Finally, Thailand adapted itself to understand the Western mindset while retaining its Eastern identity. It also understood that colonization was bringing with it modernization, often for the capitalist benefit of the predator country, under the guise of a civilizing project. 5 In order to preempt Western advances and promises of modernity, the Thai leadership began a system of raising state revenue and investment in infrastructure. While a nation like China was suffocating in bogus debts and reliant on Western powers to build infrastructure (such as railways) and in no position to challenge their dependence, Thailand was able to provide limited modernization and reinforce its legitimacy with its citizens. 6
Because of the compounded effects of consolidation, nationalism, and modernization, Thailand was able to effectively resist Western coercion and the lasting effects of colonialism.
Notes
1. Vera Simone, The Asian Pacific, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001), 3.
2. Ibid., 101
3. Ibid., 101
4. Ibid., 102
5. Ibid., 108
6. Ibid., 108
Unlike China, Thai leaders worked methodically to consolidate government power in Thailand once they perceived the European colonial threat. While at once working to avoid conflict with Western powers by avoiding reactionary or arbitrary policies that would spark a conflict, King Mongkut and his successors led a top-down reform that incorporated local power bases into a nationally controlled scheme and integrated those local leaders who lost power in the process into the national bureaucracy. 2 The focus of government transformed from that of local, semiautonomous cells of administration to a centralized body with specialized departments with national responsibility. This transformation led to a more powerful central government able to approach dissent and threats in a more cohesive way. Indeed, cultural cohesion within the nation was strengthened with the new mandate of the national government.
As in other Asian countries reacting to colonialism, nationalism played an important role in Thailand, but more in a preemptive role as opposed to an armed opposition role in the 19th and early 20th century. For example, nationalism and an idea of a unique and proud Thai state made it more difficult for Western powers to manipulate the Thai people into inequitable agreements (although some inequitable agreements were made for the sake of neutral relations with France and Britain, but not on the same devastating scale as in China). 3 The government used its power and moral capital to promote a standard Thai language (which would effectively allow all Thais to communicate in a common vernacular and concurrently weaken regional differences), elevate the prestige of the royal family as the ultimate national leadership body, and promote the role of orthodox Thammayut Buddhism in society, which the royal family was undeniably and piously devoted to. 4 These movements, in addition to other cultural reforms, served to strengthen the bond of Thai citizens and promote a nationalistic view of themselves in opposition to outside influence.
Finally, Thailand adapted itself to understand the Western mindset while retaining its Eastern identity. It also understood that colonization was bringing with it modernization, often for the capitalist benefit of the predator country, under the guise of a civilizing project. 5 In order to preempt Western advances and promises of modernity, the Thai leadership began a system of raising state revenue and investment in infrastructure. While a nation like China was suffocating in bogus debts and reliant on Western powers to build infrastructure (such as railways) and in no position to challenge their dependence, Thailand was able to provide limited modernization and reinforce its legitimacy with its citizens. 6
Because of the compounded effects of consolidation, nationalism, and modernization, Thailand was able to effectively resist Western coercion and the lasting effects of colonialism.
Notes
1. Vera Simone, The Asian Pacific, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001), 3.
2. Ibid., 101
3. Ibid., 101
4. Ibid., 102
5. Ibid., 108
6. Ibid., 108
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